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Children are slower and more error-prone when the correct response is counter to their
initial inclination (incongruent trials) than when they just need to do what comes naturally
(congruent trials). Children are almost always tested on a congruent-trial block and then on
an incongruent-trial block. That order of testing makes it impossible to determine whether
worse performance on incongruent trials is due to the need to inhibit a pre-potent response,
the need to clear the rule for Block 1 from working memory, some other demand of task-
switching, or some combination of these. However, if the congruent block and incongruent
blocks each have only one rule (e.g., “press on the same side as the stimulus” for congruent
trials and “press on the side opposite the stimulus” for incongruent trials, as on the hearts
and ﬂowers task) and children’s performance when the incongruent block is presented
ﬁrst is fully comparable to their performance when it is presented second, the only
possible explanation for their worse performance on incongruent versus congruent trials
would seem to be the added inhibitory demand on incongruent trials. Certainly, worse
performance on Block 1 would not be due to inefﬁcient clearing of working memory or
task-switching demands. We tested 96 children (49 girls) 6–10 years of age on the hearts
and ﬂowers test with order of congruent and incongruent blocks counterbalanced across
children. Children were slower and made more errors on incongruent trials regardless of
task order.We expected task-switching demands to account for some of the variance, but
to our surprise, performance was fully comparable on the incongruent block whether it
came ﬁrst or second. These results indicate that increasing inhibitory demands alone is
sufﬁcient to impair children’s performance in the face of no change in working memory
demands, suggesting that inhibition is a separate mental function from working memory.
Keywords: executive function, inhibitory control, self-regulation, cognitive control, executive control, spatial Stroop
task, Simon task, stimulus-response compatibility
INTRODUCTION
It is hotly debated whether working memory and inhibitory con-
trols are separable or not. Many argue that working memory is all
that is required; no need to posit a separate inhibitory control
ability (Cohen et al., 2002; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Nieuwen-
huis and Yeung, 2005; Hanania and Smith, 2010; Munakata
et al., 2011; Chatham et al., 2012). Others posit that inhibitory
control is an ability in its own right, separate from work-
ing memory (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1993; Levy and Anderson,
2002; Gazzaley et al., 2005; Leroux et al., 2006; Diamond, 2009;
Zanto and Gazzaley, 2009).
When performing tasks that require working memory and
inhibitory control, children are slower and make more errors on
incongruent (incompatible) blocks than on congruent (compat-
ible) ones. Each block may have only one rule but incongruent
blocks add an inhibitory demand. When the incongruent block
follows a congruent one, poorer performance on the incongru-
ent block could easily be due to problems in efﬁciently clearing the
congruent rule fromworkingmemory. Thus the workingmemory
demand might be greater on Block 2 than on Block 1. However,
when the incongruent block is presented ﬁrst, worse performance
on the incongruent block compared to the congruent one should
be attributable to the greater inhibitorydemand in the incongruent
block. Such performance, if found, would seem to provide evi-
dence in favor of working memory and inhibitory control being
separable. To our knowledge, the study reported here is the ﬁrst
to present the incongruent-trial block before the congruent one to
children.
For this study we wanted a task (a) that requires working
memory (not just memory maintenance or short-term memory),
(b) where the congruent and incongruent blocks each present
only one rule to hold and manipulate in working memory, and
(c) where there is clear empirical evidence that incongruent tri-
als require a response counter to subjects’ ﬁrst inclination or
response tendency [i.e., that “response inhibition,” a component
of “inhibitory control” (Diamond, 2013) is required]. The hearts
and ﬂowers task ﬁt that bill.
The hearts and ﬂowers task (previously called the dots task;
Davidson et al., 2006; Diamond et al., 2007) is a hybrid combining
elements of Simon and spatial Stroop tasks. For congruent trials,
subjects are to obey the rule, “Press on the same side as the stimu-
lus.” For incongruent trials, subjects are to follow the rule, “Press
on the side opposite the stimulus.” Both of those blocks require
workingmemory because we do not have “same side”or “opposite
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side” hands (we have right and left hands); on each trial those
rules must be translated into which hand to use (requiring that
subjects mentally work with the rule they are holding in mind).
This is an important difference between Simon tasks and the hearts
and ﬂowers task. Simon tasks require short-termmemory, but not
working memory, because they require simply holding two rules
in mind (“For Stimulus A, press on the right” and “For Stimulus
B, press on the left”), not mentally manipulating that information
in any way.
Short-term memory involves only “memory maintenance,”
only holding information in mind (as required by a forward digit
span taskwhere youneed to repeat back informationyou just heard
in the order in which you heard it). Working memory, in contrast,
requires memorymaintenance plus working with the information
you are holding in mind (as would be required if you need to
repeat back information you just heard re-ordering it according
to size, numerical or alphabetical order, or some other criterion;
Baddeley, 1992; Petrides, 1994, 1995; D’Esposito et al., 1995, 1998;
Owen et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1997; Smith and Jonides, 1999;
Smith et al., 1998).
Children at all ages that were tested (4–13 years) and young
adults perform signiﬁcantly better (fewer errors and faster
responding) on the Simon task (with the memory demand of
only holding information in mind) than on the hearts and ﬂow-
ers task [with the memory demands of holding information
in mind plus manipulating that information (translating “same
side” and “opposite side” into “right hand” or “left hand”)]; see
Figure 1.
People have a pre-potent tendency to respond toward a stim-
ulus (Fitts and Seeger, 1953; Simon and Rudell, 1967; Lu and
Proctor, 1995; Kornblum et al., 1999; Hommel et al., 2004; Hom-
mel, 2011). That must be inhibited when the stimulus and its
FIGURE 1 | Comparison of performance on the mixed conditions of the
hearts and flowers task with dot stimuli and of a Simon task.This is
based on within-subject comparisons of 314 participants (roughly 30 per
age; equal numbers of males and females) tested on both tasks using the
same equipment and same timing parameters (Davidson et al., 2006). At
every age, participants were signiﬁcantly faster and signiﬁcantly more
accurate on the Simon task. The dot stimuli were a gray disk and a black-
and-white-striped disk; that is the only difference between the older dots
version of the task and the current hearts and ﬂowers task. The rules for
the Simon task were, “If you see a butterﬂy, press the button on the left,
whether the butterﬂy appears on the left or right. If you see a frog, press
the button on to the right, whether the frog appears on the left or right.”
associated response are on opposite sides (incongruent trials).
Adults and children are slower and make more errors when the
stimulus appears on the side opposite its associated response
than when stimulus appears on the same side as its associated
response (called the Simon effect, the spatial incompatibility effect,
or stimulus-response incompatibility; adults: Lu and Proctor,
1995; Kornblum et al., 1999; Kunde and Stocker, 2002; Hom-
mel et al., 2004; Hommel, 2011; children: Gerardi-Coulton, 2000;
Davidson et al., 2006; Mullane et al., 2009). Indeed, when mon-
keys are to respond away from a visual stimulus, the neuronal
population vector in primary motor cortex (coding the direction
of planned movement) initially points toward the stimulus and
only then shifts to the required direction (showing a pre-potent
tendency at the neuronal level to respond toward a stimulus;
to do otherwise requires that that impulse be inhibited; Geor-
gopoulos et al., 1989; Georgopoulos, 1994). This has been seen
in humans using lateralized motor-readiness evoked potentials
(Valle-Inclan, 1996) and event-related optical imaging (EROS;
DeSoto et al., 2001). DeSoto et al. (2001) showed that incongruent
trials elicit simultaneous activation of both motor cortices (neces-
sitating the need for one to be inhibited) whereas congruent trials
elicit brain activity in only the motor cortex associated with the
response.
Thus, the hearts and ﬂowers task met all three of our criteria.
In the standard hearts and ﬂowers task, participants are instructed
(a) to press the response button on the same side (left or right)
as the stimulus (a red heart) on Block 1 (the congruent block),
(b) to press the response button on the side opposite the stim-
ulus (a red ﬂower) on Block 2 (the incongruent block), and (c)
to ﬂexibly switch between those two rules on Block 3 where the
stimulusmight be a heart or ﬂower (themixed block). Participants
of every age that has been tested (4–13 years, plus young adults)
are slower and make more errors on the mixed block (Davidson
et al., 2006). Young adults, however, are as fast and accurate on
the incongruent block as they are on the congruent one. In con-
trast, children of all ages tested (4–13 years) are slower and make
more errors on the incongruent block than the congruent one
(Davidson et al., 2006).
The hearts and ﬂowers task has been used to demonstrate
executive function gains from the Tools of the Mind preschool
curriculum (Diamond et al., 2007), to provide the ﬁrst demonstra-
tion in children of a difference in executive function performance
by COMT genotype (Diamond et al., 2004), and to demon-
strate a sex difference in which version of the COMT gene
is more beneﬁcial for executive functions (Evans et al., 2009).
It has been shown to accurately assess executive functions in
both typically developing children and children with Down syn-
drome (Edgin et al., 2010). Zaitchik et al. (2013) found that the
hearts and ﬂowers task, but not several other tasks in their
executive function battery, predicted their composite measure
of vitalist biology as it is constructed by children (as pre-
dicted) controlling for age and IQ. The relation between hearts
and ﬂowers performance and on-the-face-of-it task-demands
on their biology measures also held up (e.g., inhibitory con-
trol as indexed by hearts and ﬂowers predicted animism judg-
ments more strongly than purely factual knowledge about bodily
function).
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Using the hearts and ﬂowers task, the present study tested two
competing hypotheses:
(1) Children might err on the incongruent block because of the
addition of an inhibitory demand – the need to resist respond-
ing on the same side as the stimulus, responding on the
opposite side instead. For the congruent block children need
only do what comes naturally, but for the incongruent block
they must inhibit that and do the opposite. Thus, Hypothesis
1 is that children make more errors and take more time to
respond on the incongruent block because of their immature
ability to exercise inhibitory control.
(2) Perhaps, however, it is the task-switching requirement (and
need to efﬁciently delete the rule for Block 1 from work-
ing memory when performing Block 2) that gives children
difﬁculty. The incongruent block routinely follows the con-
gruent one on most tasks, including the hearts and ﬂowers
task. Hypothesis 2 is that it is the difﬁculty of switching
from the rule to always press on the same side as the stim-
ulus to the rule to always pressing on the side opposite the
stimulus that accounts for children’s slower response times
and increased errors on the incongruent block. We know
that switching from one rule to another can be difﬁcult even
for adults, and especially for children (Hartman and Hasher,
1991; Allport and Wylie, 2000; Monsell and Driver, 2000;
Cepeda et al., 2001; Zelazo et al., 2003; Crone et al., 2006;
Yeung et al., 2006).
Itmaybe that childrendonotwipe theirmental slate cleanwhen
they begin Block 2, and so are still holding the now-irrelevant rule
from Block 1 in mind. That wouldmean that the memory load for
themonBlock 2would be greater because theywould be holding in
mind both the congruent and incongruent rules. If that is the case,
then reversing the order in which the congruent and incongruent
blocks are presented should get rid of poorer performance on the
incongruent block. Hypothesis 1, on the other hand, leads to the
prediction that reversing the order would do nothing to diminish
the gap in children’s performance on Blocks 1 and 2 (they would
still be slower and less accurate on the incongruent block, even if
it came ﬁrst, because the inhibitory-control demand would be the
same).
In a between-subjects design we tested half the children at each
age with the congruent block ﬁrst and half with the incongruent
block ﬁrst on the hearts and ﬂowers task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Data were obtained from 96 children, ranging in age from 6
to 10 years (49% male, 51% female; see Table 1), from pub-
lic elementary schools throughout the Lower Mainland of BC,
Canada. Participants were recruited through their schools and
95% were tested at their school. The other ﬁve children were
tested at our child development lab at the University of British
Columbia.
The majority of participants who provided ethnic information
were Caucasian of European descent (52%), 16% were of East
Asian descent (most were Chinese), 12% were of South Asian
descent (most were Indian), and the rest were of other ethnic
backgrounds. All were ﬂuent in English. Informed consent was
obtained from a parents of each child, and informed assent was
obtained from each child, before testing. All participants received
a small present for their participation.
PROCEDURE
Within each age × gender grouping, half the participants were
randomly assigned to get the congruent block ﬁrst and half to
get the incongruent block ﬁrst. Participants were tested individu-
ally in a quiet room while wearing noise cancelation headphones.
The stimuli were presented on a Dell 43 cm touchscreen mon-
itor attached to an IBM ThinkPad Lenovo T6 laptop computer.
The hearts and ﬂowers task was administered using Presentation®
software.
Participants held a handlebar with both hands to keep the dis-
tance from their hands to the response buttons constant. Theywere
instructed to use only their pointer ﬁnger to press the response
button on the screen (see Figure 2).
All participants completed a button practice task beforemoving
onto hearts and ﬂowers. Two response buttons appeared on the
touchscreen monitor for the practice task. Children were to press
a response button as soon as they saw a smiley face appear on
it. This task provided baseline choice-reaction time data as well
as serving to acclimate children to using the handlebars and to
pressing the left and right response buttons on screen. Children
were corrected if they reached across the midline to respond. They
were also corrected if they left their ﬁnger on the monitor after
their response, did not keep their hands on the handlebars before
the smiley face appeared, or did not replace their ﬁnger on the
handlebars after pushing the button.
Table 1 | Number of participants within each age and gender group.
Age group (years) Mean age (years) SD N Gender Location of testing
Female (%) Male (%) Our lab School
6 6.50 0.31 18 50 50 2 16
7 7.64 0.24 15 47 53 0 15
8 8.50 0.34 16 56 44 1 15
9 9.49 0.29 23 43 57 2 21
10 10.35 0.23 24 54 46 0 24
Totals 96 51 49 5 91
www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 213 | 3
Wright and Diamond Inhibitory costs are marked in children
FIGURE 2 | A child performing the hearts and flowers test using a
touchscreen monitor and handlebars.
The same procedure for the hearts and ﬂowers task was used as
previously reported (Davidson et al., 2006; Diamond et al., 2007).
On each trial, a red heart or a red ﬂower appeared on either
the left or right side of the screen. A correct response to the
heart was to press the response box on the touchscreen mon-
itor on the same side as the heart. A correct response to the
ﬂower was to press the response box on the side opposite the
ﬂower.
On each trial, a horizontal rectangle (6 cm × 18 cm) was pre-
sented in the center of the screen. An orienting crosshair was
presented for 500 ms at center ﬁxation at the outset of each trial,
and then disappeared, replaced 500 ms later by a stimulus on the
left or right. One stimulus was presented per trial. The stimu-
lus was presented for 750 ms to children ≥7 years of age and for
1500 ms to children 6 years of age. [These timing parameters had
been determined to be age appropriate by Davidson et al. (2006)].
Each test block was preceded by instructions and a demonstration
of the task followed by a practice block. Understanding of the rule
was demonstrated by getting at least three of the four trials correct
in the practice block. If understanding was not demonstrated on
the ﬁrst practice block, the child was instructed again and given
another practice block (two children in the incongruent-ﬁrst con-
dition and two in the congruent-ﬁrst condition needed a second
practice block). No participant in the study failed to pass prac-
tice. The congruent and incongruent test blocks consisted of 12
trials each. There were 33 trials in the mixed block. Trials in each
block were presented in the same pseudo-random order to each
child.
RESULTS
The two dependent measures were speed [reaction time (RT)]
and accuracy [percentage of correct responses]. Trials with RTs
faster than 250 ms were excluded for being too fast to have
been in response to the stimulus (resulted in 5 trials being
excluded). RTs 2 standard deviations above or below a subject’s
mean were also excluded from analyses for being outliers (3 tri-
als excluded). Percentage of correct responses was calculated by
dividing the number of correct responses by the total number of
responses (excluding the exceptions just mentioned). Only correct
trials were used in calculating a child’s mean RT in each test
block.
RESULTS FOR SPEED OF RESPONDING
No signiﬁcant difference was found between RTs during button
practice (our baseline measure of choice RT) of children who
received the incongruent block ﬁrst and children who received
the congruent block ﬁrst [ANCOVA: F(1,89) = 0.83, ns] control-
ling for age, gender, and ethnicity. That is, there was no difference
in baseline speed between children who received one order of
presentation or the other. Choice RT did not vary by gender
[F(1,89) = 0.053, ns] or ethnicity [F(3,89) = 0.21, ns]. Older
children of course had faster choice RTs than younger children (all
subjects: F(1,78) = 12.34, p< 0.001; only those receiving the same
timing parameters [excludes 6-year-olds (who were given longer
to respond)]: F(1,71) = 4.17, p < 0.05).
Excluding the 6-year-olds, who were given much more time
to respond, RTs declined signiﬁcantly over age for only the
mixed condition of the hearts and ﬂowers task [mixed block:
F(3,74) = 2.639, p < 0.05; congruent block: F(3,74) = 0.69,
ns; incongruent block: F(3,74) = 0.05, ns]. Since age is a con-
tinuous variable, we also examined this using multiple regression
(controlling for gender and ethnicity) and received comparable
results [mixed block: F(1,72) = 5.07, p < 0.03; congruent block:
F(1,72) = 0.70, ns; incongruent block: F(1,76) = 0.02, ns]. RTs
did not differ for any block by gender or ethnicity.
To compare the differences in RT between the congruent block
and incongruent block for each order of testing, an ANOVA
was conducted with order in which the congruent and incon-
gruent blocks were presented as between-subject factors and
block type (congruent, incongruent) as a within-subject factor;
age, gender, and ethnicity were not included given the absence
of any signiﬁcant effects for those variables or their interac-
tions. For the congruent-ﬁrst condition (the order usually used
for the hearts and ﬂowers task) RTs in the congruent block
(Mean = 596.44 ms, SD = 116.81) were signiﬁcantly faster than
in the incongruent block (Mean = 725.17 ms, SD = 167.17):
F(1,45) = 25.79, p < 0.001. For the incongruent-ﬁrst condition,
RTs in the congruent block (Mean = 600.79 ms, SD = 138.05)
were also signiﬁcantly faster than in the incongruent block
(Mean = 721.37 ms, SD = 180.89): F(1,47) = 19.02, p < 0.001.
In both orders of testing, at every age, children responded
faster in the congruent block than in the incongruent one (see
Figure 3A). The difference between RTs on incongruent and con-
gruent blocks did not differ by the order in which the blocks
were presented: F(1,93) = 1.41, ns. At no age did the within-
child difference in speed on the two blocks differ signiﬁcantly
by order of presentation (see Figure 3B). All of the above
also held for each gender and for each ethnic group analyzed
separately.
An insigniﬁcant p-value is not always sufﬁcient for concluding
that two conditions are equivalent (Lesaffre, 2008). Equivalence
between the congruent-ﬁrst and incongruent-ﬁrst conditions on
both congruent and incongruent trials was tested by setting a
95% conﬁdence interval around the mean RT for each block
in the congruent-ﬁrst condition, and specifying equivalence as
the RTs in the incongruent-ﬁrst condition being within plus or
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Speed of responding on the congruent and incongruent blocks by order of presentation. (B) Differences in speed on incongruent and congruent
trial blocks by order of presentation.Values greater than zero, as all are, indicate that children responded faster on congruent than on incongruent blocks.
minus 1%. The mean RTs on the congruent block (Figure 4A)
and incongruent block (Figure 4B) in the incongruent-ﬁrst con-
dition fell within the speciﬁed interval of equivalence when
compared with the mean RT on the corresponding blocks in
the congruent-ﬁrst condition. This means that the mean RTs
were equivalent for congruent trials whether they came ﬁrst or
second and the mean RTs were also equivalent for incongruent
trials regardless of the order in which they we presented. The
distribution of RTs was also similar. The equivalence of the dif-
ference in RT between the congruent and incongruent blocks in
both congruent-ﬁrst and incongruent-ﬁrst conditions was also
tested using the 95% conﬁdence interval (Figure 4C). Equiv-
alence here was deﬁned as being within plus or minus 10%
the difference [note that the difference RTs is far smaller than
actual RTs, so 10% of a difference is miniscule (roughly 12 ms
or so)].
RESULTS FOR ACCURACY OF RESPONDING
Because accuracy data are binary at the individual trial level,
a generalized estimating equation using a binary logistic equa-
tion was used to compare the difference in accuracy between
the ﬁrst two trial blocks in the congruent-ﬁrst condition and
the incongruent-ﬁrst condition. Accuracy did not differ for
any block by ethnicity. Children >7 years made no errors
on the button practice that preceded testing on hearts and
ﬂowers.
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Ninety-ﬁve percent conﬁdence interval around the mean RT
for the congruent block when it came ﬁrst is shown by the unﬁlled boxes.
The thick line and gray box indicate the mean and 95% conﬁdence interval
for congruent trials when they came second. (B) Ninety-ﬁve percent
conﬁdence interval around the mean RT for the incongruent block when it
came ﬁrst is shown by the unﬁlled boxes. The thick line and gray box
indicate the mean and 95% conﬁdence interval for incongruent trials when
they came second. (C) Ninety-ﬁve percent conﬁdence intervals around the
mean RT for the differences between the congruent and incongruent
blocks when the congruent block came ﬁrst is shown by the unﬁlled boxes.
The thick line and gray box indicate the mean and 95% conﬁdence interval
for the difference between the congruent and incongruent blocks when the
incongruent block came ﬁrst.
Accuracy improved over age from 6 to 10 years on both the
congruent and incongruent blocks (chi square: congruent block:
χ2(1, N = 96) = 4.13, p < 0.04, odds ratio = 1.64; incongru-
ent block: χ2(1, N = 96) = 7.11, p < 0.01, odds ratio = 1.39).
Excluding 6-year-olds (who were givenmore time to respond than
all other children) accuracy improved over age only on the mixed
block [χ2(1, N = 77) = 7.18, p < 0.01]. All children >7 years
were correct on all trials in the congruent block. Accuracy did not
differ by ethnicity on any block or by gender on the incongru-
ent or mixed blocks. However, girls were correct on more trials
than boys in the congruent block (all ages: χ2(1, N = 96) = 5.70,
p < 0.02, odds ratio = 2.26; only children 7–10 years old: χ2(1,
N = 77) = 9.40, p < 0.02, odds ratio = 3.54).
In the congruent-ﬁrst condition, participants responded more
accurately on the congruent trial block (mean = 97.26%,
SD = 5.07%) than on the incongruent one (mean = 92.17%,
SD = 8.50%): χ2(1, N = 46) = 7.50, p < 0.006, odds
ratio = 4.58. In the incongruent-ﬁrst condition as well, the
percentage of correct responses was higher in the congruent
block (mean = 95.50%, SD = 6.77%) than in the incongruent
one (mean = 91.00%, SD = 7.96%): χ2(1, N = 50) = 8.23,
p < 0.004, odds ratio = 3.02. At every age, regardless of the
order in which the conditions were tested, children made fewer
errors in the congruent block than in the incongruent one (see
Figure 5A).
An ANOVA within a General Linear Model with age as a con-
tinuous between-subject variable, with order of trial blocks and
gender as categorical between-subject variables, and with block
type (congruent or incongruent) as a categorical within-subject
factor was conducted to determine whether the difference in accu-
racy between the two blocks of trials was similar or different in the
two orders of testing. The difference in accuracy between congru-
ent and incongruent blocks did not vary by order of presentation
[F(1,89) = 2.04, ns]. At no age did the within-child difference in
accuracy on the two blocks differ signiﬁcantly by order of pre-
sentation (see Figure 5B). All of the above also held regardless
of ethnicity or gender and there were no signiﬁcant effects of, or
interactions with, gender or ethnicity. Children of 6 years were
as accurate on the incongruent block as the congruent one, so
including them in the analyses showed a signiﬁcant increase in
the difference in percentage of correct trials on congruent versus
incongruent trials by age [F(1,89)=5.29,p<0.02]. Includingonly
the children who received the same timing parameters (children
7–10 years), there was no change in this difference over age.
Again, a difference that fails to reach signiﬁcance is insufﬁcient
to demonstrate equivalence, so a speciﬁed interval of equiva-
lence was again used. The interval was set at 2% because one
incorrect answer causes a large change in accuracy values. Both
mean accuracy on the congruent block (Figure 6A) and on the
incongruent block (Figure 6B) for the incongruent-ﬁrst order of
testing fell within the interval of equivalence for the congruent-
ﬁrst order of testing. The distribution of percentage of correct
responses on incongruent blocks was also equivalent across the
two orders of testing (see Figure 6A). The distributions of per-
centage of correct responses on congruent blocks, however, did
differ: Children made more errors on congruent trials when they
followed incongruent ones than when congruent trials came ﬁrst,
providing a hint of a subtle difference in performance on congru-
ent trials by order of testing. The equivalence of the difference in
accuracy between the congruent and incongruent blocks in both
congruent-ﬁrst and incongruent-ﬁrst conditions was also tested
using the 95% conﬁdence interval (Figure 6C). This interval of
equivalence was set at 1% because a difference score always has
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Accuracy on the congruent and incongruent blocks by order of presentation. (B) Difference in accuracy between congruent and incongruent
blocks by order of presentation.Values greater than zero indicate that children were correct on more trialsin congruent than in incongruent blocks.
a small range of variability. The difference in accuracy between
the two blocks was equivalent regardless of which block came
ﬁrst.
DISCUSSION
This study explored what the critical difference is between incon-
gruent and congruent blocks that accounts for why children
perform so much worse on incongruent blocks. For the ﬁrst time
we know of, the order in which congruent and incongruent blocks
were presented to children was varied. Worse performance on the
incongruent block of the hearts andﬂowers taskwhen it comes sec-
ond could be accounted for by greater working memory demands
(subjects might still be holding the ﬁrst rule in mind when per-
forming Block 2), greater inhibitory demands, task-switching
demands, or some combination of those. However, worse per-
formance on the incongruent block when it comes ﬁrst (as found
here) can be accounted for only by greater demands on inhibition.
Regardless of the order in which the congruent and incongru-
ent blocks were presented, children at every age were slower and
made more errors on the incongruent block than the congruent
one. That is, they performed worse on the incongruent block even
when it was presented ﬁrst, and this difference in performance was
no greater when the incongruent block came second. These results
strongly support that the source of the difﬁculty for children is not
switching from the rule in Block 1 to the rule in Block 2, nor
does the source of their problem seem to be holding in mind the
rule for Block 1 when they perform Block 2 (not having efﬁciently
deleted it from working memory); the source of their difﬁculty
seems to be the need to inhibit a pre-potent response on incon-
gruent trials. These results also show that varying the demand
on inhibition (the incongruent block requires inhibition of a pre-
potent behavioral tendencywhereas the congruent block does not)
holding working memory demands constant (when the congru-
ent block is presented ﬁrst it requires holding one rule in mind
and when the incongruent block is presented ﬁrst it, too, requires
holding only one rule in mind) is sufﬁcient to produce a decre-
ment in children’s performance evident both in poorer speed and
accuracy.
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FIGURE 6 | (A) Ninety-ﬁve percent conﬁdence interval around the mean
accuracy for the congruent block in the congruent-ﬁrst condition (unﬁlled
boxes and solid lines) and comparison to the incongruent-ﬁrst condition
(solid box), plus or minus 2%. (B) Ninety-ﬁve percent conﬁdence interval
around the mean accuracy for the incongruent block in the congruent-ﬁrst
condition (unﬁlled boxes and solid lines) and comparison to the incongruent-
ﬁrst condition (solid box), plus or minus 2%. (C) Ninety-ﬁve percent
conﬁdence interval around the mean difference in accuracy between
congruent and incongruent blocks in congruent-ﬁrst and incongruent-ﬁrst
conditions. Solid lines represent the accuracy difference in the congruent-
ﬁrst condition and the gray box represents the accuracy difference in the
incongruent-ﬁrst condition.
A memory theorist might protest that worse performance on
incongruent trials even when they come ﬁrst could result from the
difﬁculty of maintaining the rule sufﬁciently active in working
memory for it to “win” in the battle for controlling behavior
in the face of interference from the natural inclination to press
on the same side as a stimulus. This seems to allow for no
disproof of a working memory hypothesis, however, because
it asserts that whenever the demand on inhibition is increased
(whenever a strong disposition to act a certain way must be
suppressed or overridden) ipso facto the demand on working
memory is increased. What we know about the incongruent con-
dition is that a strong competing response is present (a strong
tendency to give a response that would be incorrect must not
win; it must be inhibited). We also know that the incongruent
and congruent conditions require holding and manipulating in
working memory only one rule each. Those are objective behav-
ioral observations. It is an unproven hypothesis that inhibition
of a competing response is accomplished by working memory
“working harder.” It is also an unproven hypothesis that inhi-
bition of a competing response is accomplished by executive
attention working harder to keep one’s attention focused on the
relevant rule. This paper reports what is behaviorally available for
observation.
These results provide evidence of the consequences of a greater
inhibitory demand (on incongruent trials), independent of any
difference in the quantity or complexity of what must be held
in working memory. In the face of no change in the working
memory demand, increasing the demand on inhibitory control
alone is sufﬁcient to induce more errors and slower respond-
ing in children. Adults may not appreciate how inordinately
difﬁcult inhibition is for young children because it is so much
less difﬁcult for adults (adults show no difference in perfor-
mance on congruent and incongruent blocks of the hearts and
ﬂowers task, or usually of Simon or spatial Stroop tasks, show-
ing errors and slower responding only on mixed blocks [Lu
and Proctor, 1995]). Often conditions differ in both working
memory and inhibitory control demands making it impossible
to attribute differences in performance speciﬁcally to working
memory or inhibitory control. Here, where demands on work-
ing memory and inhibitory have been dissociated, it is possible
to see that increasing inhibitory control demands alone is suf-
ﬁcient to induce worse performance in children 6–10 years
of age.
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